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ARTICLE
A STATE'S OBLIGATION TO FUND HORMONAL
THERAPY AND SEX-REASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR
PRISONERS DIAGNOSED WITH GENDER IDENTITY
DISORDER
Rena Lindevaldsent
I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time in United States history, on September 4, 2012, a
federal judge ordered a state to provide male-to-female sex-reassignment
surgery to a prison inmate with gender identity disorder ("GID"). Patients
with GID suffer psychological distress, including depression, thoughts of
suicide, and the desire to amputate sex organs, because their perception of
reality is different than actual reality-namely, they believe their gender is
different than their biological sex. For many GID patients, they are certain
that their psychological distress will be alleviated if they can become the sex
they believe they should be through the use of cross-gender hormones,
cross-dressing, and, for some, sex-reassignment surgery. In the situation of
prisoners with GID, the question becomes whether the state must provide
the desired hormones or sex-reassignment surgery.
Although the United States Supreme Court has concluded that a state has
an obligation to provide prisoners with medical care that meets minimal
standards of adequacy, a prisoner establishes an Eighth Amendment
violation only when state officials are deliberately indifferent to serious
medical needs. This article explores whether a state law imposing a flat ban
on the use of funds to provide cross-gender hormones or sex-reassignment
surgery for prisoners diagnosed with GID satisfies the Eighth Amendment
standard of deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs. In other
words, the issue is whether it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for
a state to refuse to provide hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to GID
prisoners. The district court in Kosilek v. Spencer' held that it does: the state

t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Liberty University
School of Law. Associate Director, Liberty Center for Law & Policy. J.D., magna cum laude,
Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank Matthew Peak and Joshua Mast for their
invaluable research in preparing this Article.
1. Kosilekv. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,2012).
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violated the Eighth Amendment in providing feminizing hormones to
Kosilek but refusing to provide him sex-reassignment surgery.
Part I of this article lays out a state's obligation to provide medical
treatment to its prisoners consistent with the Supreme Court's current
Eighth Amendment precedent. Part II discusses issues unique to a state's
determination of proper treatment for GID prisoners. Those issues
primarily focus on the conflicting views in the medical community on the
proper treatment of GID patients. Part III highlights several recent court
decisions that exemplify the conflicts discussed in Part II, including whether
a state's obligation differs with respect to GID prisoners who commenced
hormonal treatment before entering the prison system and those who were
diagnosed with GID while in prison. Part IV asserts that a state acts
consistently with its Eighth Amendment obligations when it prohibits the
use of any funds for hormonal therapy or sex-reassignment surgery of GID
prisoners. The proper course of treatment for GID should be to treat the
underlying causes of the psychological distress, not to alter the prisoner's
physical characteristics to match the gender the prisoner believes he should
be.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A.

The Supreme CourtHas Decided That the Eighth Amendment Prohibits
More Conduct Than That Prohibitedby Our Founders.

The text of the Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual
punishments" shall not be "inflicted."' Since early in the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that the Eighth
Amendment is to be interpreted according to the standards that prevailed
when the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791 ...

.s

Instead, the

Supreme Court has tested the constitutionality of criminal punishmentsprimarily the death penalty-by asking whether the imposed punishment
2. Id. at *53.
3. For purposes of this article, the author is analyzing the Eighth Amendment claim as
if the Supreme Court has properly determined that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment has evolved, and will continue to do so, from the meaning given to the
Amendment by the founders. This author, however, shares the views of Justices Thomas and
Scalia as more fully discussed infra Part II.A.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
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comports with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' To determine what comports with the evolving
standards of decency, the Court considers "'objective indicia of society's
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice."' 7 As a
result, what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment "'necessarily
embodies a moral judgment' that "'change[s] as the basic mores of society
change." In fact, the Court has also expressly stated that its "own
independent judgment" plays a part in the determination of whether certain
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.'
The evolving standards of decency test has led the Court to prohibit
excessive sanctions,o prohibit the death penalty for certain classes of
crimes" or for crimes committed by certain individuals,
require
punishments to be proportional to the crime,13 require individualized

6. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
419-20 (2008) (repeating the evolving standards of decency as the prevailing standard).
7. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).
8. Id. at 419 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
9. Id. at 421. The fact that the Court admittedly interprets the Eighth Amendment
according to its own value judgments about the validity of the punishment raises separation
of powers concerns. When any court substitutes its own policy judgment for that of the
legislature, it improperly usurps legislative powers. The Utah Supreme Court has explained
that
"As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the
courts. This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires
placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The
responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours-of identifying
priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between
competing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's."
Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18
(Mich. 1999)).
10. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
11. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (declaring it unconstitutional to execute a
man who had raped an adult woman).
12. The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional statutes that permitted execution
of juveniles, Roper, 543 U.S. at 570-73, and those deemed "mentally retarded," Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 320 (2002).
13. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
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sentencing determinations,14 and prohibit a mandatory sentence of life
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders."
Justices Scalia and Thomas have criticized the evolving standards of
decency standard as inconsistent with the original understanding of the
Eighth Amendment. In particular, they reject the notion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits certain punishment for specified classes of offenders
or that it requires individualized sentencing in capital punishment.16 Rather,
the Eighth Amendment prohibition was originally intended to .'prohibit[]
torturous methods of punishment-specifically methods akin to those that
had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted.""'
In short, it does not authorize courts to invalidate any
punishment they deem disproportionate to the severity of the
crime or to a particular class of offenders. Instead, the clause
"leaves the unavoidably moral question of who "deserves" a
particular nonprohibited method of punishment to the judgment
of the legislatures that authorize the penalty.""
In fact, Justices Thomas and Scalia have explained that courts did not
even begin applying the Eighth Amendment to claims concerning prison
conditions until the 1960s, and it was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court
first did so." From the founding era until the mid-1900s, "punishment" in
the Eighth Amendment was assigned the generally understood meaning of
"the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime."20 In 1976, however,
the United States Supreme Court took a different approach to the meaning
of cruel and unusual punishments.

14. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983) (declaring that in death penalty cases, the
Eighth Amendment requires an "individualizeddetermination on the basis of the character
of the individual and the circumstances of the crime") (emphasis added).
15. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
16. Id. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2044 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
18. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2045 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
19. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,40 (1993).
20. Id. at 38.

2012]

STATE'S OBLIGATION TO FUND HORMONAL THERAPY

19

B. The Eighth Amendment As Applied to Medical Treatment of Prisoners.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"' prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 2 1 Prison officials, therefore, must provide "humane conditions
of confinement;" "ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing,
shelter, and medical care[;]" and "must 'take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates."'22 Failure to provide this basic care is
"incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in
civilized society."23
Although prison officials must provide adequate medical care, not every
failure to provide such care constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.
For example, an accident or even basic negligence is not sufficient. 24 Rather,
to state a claim, "'a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is
only such indifference that can offend "evolving standards of decency" in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.' 25 The prisoner must also show that
the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to "a substantial risk of
serious harm."26
The deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm includes
both an objective and subjective component.2 ' The inmate demonstrates the
objective component by showing that "he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm."28 If the inmate's claim is based on
a denial of medical care, the inmate must also demonstrate that he has a
serious medical need for which he has not received adequate medical care.2 9
21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)).
22. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526-27 (1984)).
23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment had been violated by the lack of medical attention afforded mentally ill prison
inmates as a result of extensive overcrowding in California prisons).
24. Farmer,511 U.S. at 835.
25. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660, at *10 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,
2012) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-04).
26. Farmer,511 U.S. at 842.
27. Id. at 846.
28. Id. at 834.
29. Id. at 837.
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A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or "one 'that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention."'3 0 The First Circuit
has explained that adequate services provided to treat a serious medical
need are those "reasonably commensurate with modern medical science
and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards."" It also
must be based on "sound medical judgment" that is determined by the
individual prisoner's needs.3 2 In analyzing the objective component of an
Eighth Amendment medical care claim, courts point out that a prisoner
need not receive "ideal care" or "the care of his choice."33 Rather, prison
officials are entitled to exercise discretion in deciding among different
adequate treatments.
The subjective component of the claim focuses on the prison official's
knowledge of the need for medical care and his deliberate indifference
toward the serious medical need.34 "'[T]he official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."'3 5 A court is
permitted to infer an official's state of mind from his behavior. Thus,
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of an inmate can be
demonstrated by evidence of "denial, delay, or interference with prescribed
health care."36 Nevertheless, even if a prison official knows of the substantial
risk of serious harm that a prisoner faces, the Eighth Amendment is not
violated if the denial of the particular medical care is "based on reasonable,

30. Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting
Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203,208 (1st Cir. 1990)).
31. United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579, 583 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.
DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987)).
32. See Iseley v. Beard, 200 Fed. Appx. 137, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2006); Bates v. Witti, 215
F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The sound medical judgment
component does not, however, mean that prisoners state an Eighth Amendment claim
simply by alleging facts giving rise to the suggestion of medical malpractice. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Rather, the sound medical judgment component focuses on
whether the medical determination made by the prison officials was based on an
individualized assessment of how to appropriately treat the prisoner.
33. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660, at *3 (D. Mass.
Sept. 4, 2012).
34. Id. at*13.
35. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
36. Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting DesRosiers v. Moran,
949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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good faith judgments balancing the inmate's medical needs with other
legitimate, penological considerations."3 7
For example, in Perkins v. Kansas Department of Corrections," the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim
based on the state's failure to provide a specific prescription drug for the
prisoner's HIV.39 The prisoner conceded that the state provided two drugs
to treat his HIV.' He claimed, however, that unless he was given a third
drug, his HIV would become immune to the first two drugs.41 The court
found that the prisoner "simply disagrees with medical staff about the
course of his treatment. This disagreement does not give rise to a claim
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." 42
In contrast, in Chance v. Armstrong,43 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the motion by prison officials to dismiss an Eighth
Amendment claim that raised the question of whether the prison's refusal
to provide a certain course of treatment preferred by the inmate was based
on sound medical judgment." In response to Mr. Chance's ongoing dental
concerns, a dentist and oral surgeon recommended that Mr. Chance have
three teeth pulled.45 Mr. Chance asserted that less invasive and painful
procedures would remedy his dental problems. 4 6 Another dentist advised
Mr. Chance that his dental problems could be resolved by pulling one tooth
and filling another.4 7 In fact, yet another dentist eventually filled one of the
teeth, resolving the problems with that tooth. 8
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court assumed that the dental
problems constituted a serious medical condition sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim 49 and that he had received inadequate treatment

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660, at *11.
Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 700-701.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id. at 702.
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for that condition." As to deliberate indifference, the court explained that
"mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a
constitutional claim."" In Chance, however, the question was whether the
decision to pull three teeth was based on sound medical judgment (and thus
the prisoner simply disagreed with the course of treatment chosen) or based
on a monetary incentive-namely, that the oral surgeon would be paid
more money to pull three teeth rather than one.52 The court explained that
if the decision was not made on sound medical judgment, it would
constitute deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs.53
In the context of GID prisoners asserting Eighth Amendment claims, the
key question is whether a prison's decision to categorically, or on a case-bycase basis, provide psychotherapy rather than cross-gender hormones or
sex-reassignment surgery is one that constitutes deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need.
II. UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER

A. How the Medical Profession Defines GenderIdentity Disorder
Gender identity disorder is listed as a psychiatric disorder in the DSMIV-TR." The DSM is a manual published by the American Psychiatric
Association and is used by mental health professionals as an assessment and
diagnostic tool. It identifies mental health conditions and describes
symptoms and other statistics concerning the mental health condition. A
task force report of the American Psychological Association" on Gender
Identity and Gender Variance explained that "the diagnostic criteria for
GID include (a) a strong or a persistent cross-gender identification, (b)
persistent discomfort with one's sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the

50. Id. at 703.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 703-04.
53. Id. at 704.
54. The DSM refers to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. It expected that the DSM-V, to be published in 2013, will no
longer include GID as a disorder. Rather, it will be identified as gender dysphoria. American
Psychiatric Association, Recent Updates to Proposed Revisions for DSM-5, DSM-5
DEVELOPMENT (last visited Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/RecentUpdates.aspx.
55. The American Psychological Association and American Psychiatric Association are
two separate entities.
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gender role associated with one's sex, and (c) clinically significant distress
or impairment in functioning.""6
The feelings of dysphoria can vary in intensity. Some patients
are able to manage the discomfort, while others become unable
to function without taking steps to correct the disorder. A person
with GID often experiences severe anxiety, depression, and other
psychological disorders. Those with GID may attempt to commit
suicide or to mutilate their own genitals."
One court has described GID as believing that a person is "'cruelly
imprisoned within a body incompatible with their real gender identity.""
In recent years, some have referred to GID as gender dysphoria in an effort
to destigmatize GID." Regardless of the label, there are differences of
opinion concerning the proper course of treatment for those with GID or
gender dysphoria.60
B. There Are Conflicting Views on the ProperCourse of Treatment of GID.
While there seems to be some variation in the appropriate treatment
regimen of a GID-diagnosed patient based on their age, treatment
approaches can be generally divided into two categories. One approach is to
provide GID patients with hormones and, for some, sex-reassignment
surgery, based on certain protocols established by the Harry Benjamin
International Gender Dysphoria Association's Standards of Carefor Gender
56.

AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON GENDER IDENTITY

AND GENDER VARIANCE 31 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT],

available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender-identity-report.pdf.
57. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 2011).
58. Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 6'-0, 611 (D.C. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting THE MERCK
MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 418 (1997)).
59. James Phillips, Gender Identity Disorder in Prison:Depending on a Diagnosis That is
Soon

to

Disappear,

PSYCHIATRIC

TIMES

(Sept.

23,

2012),

available

http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/gender-disorders/content/article/10168/2105073;

at

cf 2008

GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 11, 22, 26.

60. See 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 45. GID is distinct
from the incredibly small number of people who have an intersex condition. Individuals with
GID have normal genitalia. By contrast, a person with an intersex condition has genitalia
that cannot be classified as male or female or has sex chromosomes that are inconsistent with
the person's physical characteristics. See Teresa Zakaria, Note, By Any Other Name: Defining
Male and Female in Marriage Statutes, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 358 (2005) (citing Leonard
Sax, How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling,39 J.Sex. Res. 174, 175
(2002)). The intersex conditions have a prevalence of approximately 0.018%. Id.
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Identity Disorder.6' This approach seeks to align the patient's biological sex
with his beliefs about his gender. Another approach is to treat the
underlying causes of GID through psychological counseling or
psychotherapy. 62 This second approach seeks to align the patient's beliefs
about his gender with his biological sex. The different treatment approaches
are driven in large part by ideological differences regarding "the origins,
meanings, and fixity/malleability of gender identity."6
In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association first classified GID as a
mental disorder.64 Since the late 1970s, shortly after the American
Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder,
there has been a growing number of practitioners and advocacy groups who
believe that identifying patients as having GID and treating them with the
goal of aligning gender identity with the genetic sex is to "pathologize
differences in gender identity or expression."6 ' These practitioners maintain
61. Now in its seventh version, the Harry Benjamin standards have been adopted by the
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) as the appropriate
treatment
protocols.
The
Harry
Benjamin
standards
are
available
at
http://www.wpath.org/documents2/socv6.pdf. That the medical profession is relying on the
work of Harry Benjamin as established protocols in this area is itself problematic. Dr. Harry
Benjamin, an international sexologist, was a colleague of Alfred Kinsey. Among other things
that should call into question the validity of his work, Dr. Kinsey admittedly performed
sexual experiments on hundreds of infants and children. See JUDITH A. REISMAN, CRIMES AND
CONSEQUENCES: THE RED QUEEN AND THE GRAND SCHEME 132-65 (2d ed. 1998). Dr.
Benjamin wrote the introduction to a book of another Kinsey colleague, Rene Guyon. Mr.
Guyon was a French lawyer who coined the phrase "sex by age eight or else it's too late."
Ronald D. Ray, Kinsey's Legal Legacy, THE NEW AMERICAN, Jan. 19, 1998, at 31. In the
introduction to Mr. Guyon's book, entitled Sexual Ethics, Dr. Benjamin wrote that, based on
Kinsey's work, we needed to completely revise our legal and moral codes. "It probably comes
as a jolt to many, even open-minded people, when they realize that chastity cannot be a
virtue because it is not a natural state." Id.
62. Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2004, at 34-38, available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/02/surgical-sex--35.
63. William Byne et al., Report of the American Psychiatric Association Task Force on
Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder, 41 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 759, 769 (2012),
availableat http://www.springerlink.com/content/65145105t4000220/?MUD=MP.
64. Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, From Mental Disorder to latrogenic Hypogonadism:
Dilemmas in Conceptualizing Gender Identity Variants As Psychiatric Conditions, 39
ARCHIVES
OF
SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR
461,
462
(2010),
available
at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/p641526l0v67k476/.
65. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 3
(7th

ver.

2012)

[hereinafter

WPATH

Standards

http://www.wpath.org/documents/SOC V7 03-17-12.pdf.

of

Care],

available

at
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that the proper approach of treatment is to "provide care . .. that affirms
patients' gender identities and reduces the distress of gender dysphoria.""
"Affirmation," in this context, often translates into doing whatever is
necessary to bring external gender characteristics in line with internal belief
of gender.6 ' For those who seek to affirm the patient's gender identity when
it conflicts with his biological sex, GID is not considered a disorder. Thus,
patients who identify as the opposite gender of their genetic sex are to be
encouraged to accept and embrace their inner belief. This can be
accomplished by encouraging patients to live as the opposite gender role,
undertaking a hormone regimen to either delay puberty or change their
physical appearance to reflect their expressed gender identity, or
undergoing sex-reassignment surgery to remove and replace sexual organs
with those of the person's desired gender. 8
The greater a patient's distress over the incongruence between his
biological sex and desired gender, the more prone the professional is to
recommend changing that patient's biological characteristics through
hormones and surgery." The World Professional Association for
Transgender Health ("WPATH") is among the organizations that support a
person's ability to choose to undergo hormone therapy and sexreassignment surgery. WPATH describes itself as an international,
professional association with a mission to promote "evidence-based care,
education, research, advocacy, public policy, and respect for transgender
health.""o WPATH believes that pathologizing differences in gender identity
expression-including even diagnosing someone with GID-demonstrates
a lack of respect for patients. Instead, treatment should affirm a person's
choice of gender identity.7 2
The WPATH Standards of Care set forth protocols for treatment.73 The
treatment options for patients with GID include living consistent with one's
gender identity (which may involve cross-dressing), hormone therapy to

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1,3, 5.
68. Id. at9-10.
69. For example, the WPATH takes the position that "[t]reatment is available to assist
people with such distress to explore their gender identity and find a gender role that is
comfortable for them." Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9-10.
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feminize or masculinize the body, puberty-delaying hormones in children
or adolescents, surgery to change sex characteristics, and psychotherapy.74
The treatment protocols indicate that prior to surgery to change sex
characteristics, a person should engage in a twelve-month period of taking
hormones and living in a gender role that is consistent with his perceived
gender identity.75 For children, the treatment protocols also provide that
delaying hormones should be used to prevent onset of puberty and that
children as young as sixteen could be given cross-gender hormones. Dr.
Norman Spack at the Gender Management Clinic in Boston, Massachusetts,
reports that he has worked with a local plastic surgeon to have breast
removal surgery performed on a female who desired to transition to being a
male.n Since the Clinic opened in 2007, Dr. Spack and others have worked
with an average of nineteen children per year to assist them in changing
their biological sex characteristics to reflect their gender identity.
GID stands alone, however, in treating patients in a manner that fosters
the patient's belief about himself when that belief does not align with
reality.79 For example, those with a Compulsive Overeating Disorder are
encouraged to reduce their mental dependency on food consumption,so
while patients with Anorexia or Bulimia are encouraged to increase their
food intake or retain their food, despite mental impulses to the contrary.
In other words, an anorexic is not encouraged to believe she is overweight
and in need of losing weight; she is encouraged to attain a proper
understanding of the role of food in her life and a healthy self-perception.

74. Id. at 9-14.
75. Id. at 60.

76. Id. at 18-20.
77. The Associated Press, Sex-Change Treatment for Kids on the Rise (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-204_162-57381241/sex-change-treatment-forkids-on-the-rise/.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Zakaria, supra note 60, at 349, 359 & n.47 ("GID is the only pathology for
which 'the patient makes the diagnosis and prescribes the treatment"').

80. Denise E. Wilfley et al., A Randomized Comparison of Group Cognitive-Behavioral
Therapy and Group InterpersonalPsychotherapyfor the Treatment of Overweight Individuals
with Binge-Eating Disorder, 59 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 713, 717-18 (Aug. 2002),
availableat http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=206650.
81. Cynthia M. Bulik et al., Anorexia Nervosa, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 575, 580 (Peter Sturmey & Michel Hersen eds., 2012); see
also Zakaria, supra note 60, at 362.
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No one would suggest that liposuction is the proper treatment protocol for
the malnourished anorexic because she believes she is overweight.
Body Integrity Identity Disorder ("BIID") is probably the most analogous
disorder to GID, and yet the course of treatments for each differs
drastically. BIID causes a physically whole person to desire to become an
amputee.8 2 As with GID, the belief is so persistent that some patients have
attempted self-amputation of a limb." If the American Psychological
Association were to approach BIID in the same way it approaches the
treatment of GID, then it and other mental health professionals would
encourage their patients to schedule appointments with surgeons to remove
healthy limbs. Yet, given the very few instances where BIID amputations
have been performed,84 it seems that the medical establishment does not
believe it constitutes sound medical judgment to perform an amputation on
a physically whole person, even if the patient desires to be an amputee.
It seems inconsistent with other treatment modalities to foster a client's
version of reality that is inconsistent with actual reality, the actual reality
being the biological facts; additionally, an effort to help the patient is also
inconsistent when it fosters that belief with a hormone regimen or major
surgery that fails to treat the root issues of the mental distress. Thus, there
are other professionals who take the position that GID patients should be
treated with psychotherapy rather than hormones and surgery."
Significantly, even those professionals who advocate the use of hormones or
surgery believe that psychotherapy is an important part of treatment.86
This other approach is justified for several reasons. First, and perhaps
most obvious, is the perspective that gender is an immutable trait, is binary

82. Michael B. First, Desire for Amputation of a Limb: Paraphilia,Psychosis, or a New
Type of Identity Disorder, 35 PSYCHOL. MED. 919, 926-27 (2005), available at
http://www.biid-info.org/images/d/d8/Desire-for-amputation-of-a-limb.pdf.
83. Id. at 926.
84. Id. at 919 (observing that seventeen percent of subjects had an arm or leg amputated
with one-third obtaining the amputation through a doctor); see also Mo Costandi, The
Science and Ethics of Voluntary Amputation, NEUROPHILOSOPHY (May 30, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/neurophilosophy/2012/may/30/1
(describing how a
doctor's decision to perform voluntary amputations was deemed an "inappropriate" medical
procedure).
85. McHugh, supra note 62.
86. WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 61 ("[I]t is recommended that these
patients also have regular visits with a mental health or other medical professional.").
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in nature, and coincides from birth with an individual's sex." The Supreme
Court has long held that sex is an immutable characteristic." At birth, the
sex of the child is determined by genes contained in two of the forty-six
chromosomes in human cells, referred to as the "sex chromosomes."" Once
a child is born, the child's family then develops and fosters a child's identity,
including gender identity, by teaching the child gender-appropriate
behavior. GID, therefore, is properly viewed as the result of one or more
physiological problems, or a result of environmental factors influencing a
person's perception of a particular gender."o Biologically, however, nothing
is wrong with the person.
Second, the psychotherapy approach that seeks to align one's gender
identity with biological sex avoids the medical risks associated with
hormone use and sex-reassignment surgery, as well as the ethical risk of not
being able to obtain informed consent from a patient with a mental
disorder. Prolonged use of hormones to chemically change the body to
appear more like the targeted gender have serious health risks." These risks
can include, among others, an increased likelihood of cardiovascular
disease, stroke, deep vein thrombosis, pulmonary embolism, diabetes,
elevated liver enzymes, sleep apnea, hypertension, and the destabilization of
psychiatric disorders in patients who are bipolar or schizoaffective. 92
Hormone treatment also can negatively impact a patient's future ability to
have children. As with any surgery, sex-reassignment surgery carries its
own risks, including post-operative bleeding, hematoma, infection,
hypertrophic scarring, and other risks associated with the attempt to alter

87. Scripture also affirms the binary nature of sex. See Genesis 1:27 ("So God created
mankind in his own image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created
them."); Genesis 5:2 ("He created them male and female, and blessed them. . . ."); Mark 10:6
("But from the beginning of the creation, God 'made them male and female.'").
88. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n.2 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
89. See Zakaria, supra note 60, at 352 (citing D. PETER SNUSTAD & MICHAEL J. SIMMONS,
PRINCIPLES OF GENETICS 126, 137 (3d ed. 2003)).

90. K. J. Zucker, Children with Gender Identity Disorder: Is There a Best Practice?,56
NEUROPSYCHIATRIE DE L'ENFANCE ET DE L'ADOLESCENCE 358, 363 (2008).
91.

GENDER IDENTITY RESEARCH AND EDUCATION SOCIETY, A GUIDE To HORMONE

THERAPY FOR TRANS PEOPLE 10-12 (2007), available at http://www.gires.org.uklassets/DOH-

Assets/pdf/doh-hormone-therapy.pdf.
92. Id.; see also WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 40.
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genitalia." Both hormone treatment and sex-reassignment surgery may
irrevocably transform the body, which has serious implications for GID
patients who later report regret for having chosen this treatment
approach.9 4 In addition, while informed consent is recognized as
professionally necessary in order to expose a GID patient to the serious
risks associated with hormones or surgery,9" questions arise about the
ability to obtain informed consent for surgery to alter one's physical
characteristics from a person who is suffering from a mental disorder
concerning his gender identity.
Third, statistics demonstrate that most children, and a small number of
adults, diagnosed with GID eventually become "comfortable with their natal
gender."' While there is little research into whether successful therapy is
the cause for the patient eventually accepting a gender identity that is
consistent with his biological sex, 7 the phenomenon itself implies that GID
is a mental disorder in need of psychotherapy rather than hormones and
surgery to alter one's physical characteristics.
The fourth rationale for the therapy-only approach is that in the absence
of solid medical evidence concerning the causes of and effective treatment
modalities for GID, medical professionals should take the approach that is
consistent with their ethical obligation to do no harm. Psychotherapy is the
only alternative that does not harm an individual who may actually be
mentally impaired. If GID is a disorder, the only professional way to deal
with it is to attempt to fix the problem. Barring clear evidence that GID is
not a mental disorder, discretion would advise that a conservative approach
that does not increase the health risks of a patient is the responsible
choice."
When the GID patient is a prisoner, the treatment options are more
complicated. Given the debate surrounding the proper treatment of GID, a
key question in the litigation by prisoners who have alleged deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs has been whether the prison's chosen
93.

CAMERON BOWMAN & JOSHUA GOLDBERG, CARE OF THE PATIENT UNDERGOING SEX

(SRS) 11-14, 23-26 (2006), available at http://transhealth.vch.ca/
resources/library/tcpdocs/guidelines-surgery.pdf
94. See Stig-Eric Olsson & Anders Moller, Regret After Sex Reassignment Surgery in a
Male-to-Female Transsexual: A Long-Term Follow-Up, 35 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
501, 501 (2006).
95. WPATH Standards of Care, supra note 65, at 24.
96. Byne et al., supra note 63, at 763.
97. Id. at 771-72.
98. Cf McHugh, supra note 62.
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY
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method of treatment constituted deliberate indifference. In Wisconsin, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals directed the prison officials to provide
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to prisoners.99 In Massachusetts, a
federal district court held that the Eighth Amendment required the state to
pay for a prisoner's sex-reassignment surgery. 00
III. EXPLORING WHETHER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES PRISON
OFFICIALS TO PROVIDE HORMONES OR SEX-REASSIGNMENT SURGERY TO
PRISONERS WITH

GID

A. The Seventh CircuitCourt of Appeals Concluded That a Complete Ban
on ProvidingHormones to Prisonerswith GID Violated the Eighth
Amendment.
In an effort to prevent taxpayer funding of hormone therapy or sexreassignment surgery for prison inmates, Wisconsin passed the Inmate Sex
Change Prevention Act in 2005.10o Prior to the Act, the Department of
Corrections ("DOC") permitted prison officials to provide hormones to
GID prisoners but would not provide sex-reassignment surgery.10 2All three
plaintiffs had been receiving hormones prior to the Act's passage.103 After
the passage of the Act, but prior to its effective date, the DOC began
tapering plaintiffs off their hormones in order to be in compliance with the
Act on its effective date of January 24, 2006.1o4 Alleging violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiffs
filed suit, requesting a preliminary injunction.'s The Eighth Amendment
claim was premised on refusal to provide hormones and the failure to
provide an individualized assessment of whether hormones are appropriate

99. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011).
100. Kosilekv. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,2012).
101. Id. at 552-53.
102. Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 850 n.5. (E.D. Wis. 2010).
103. Id. at 863.
104. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 8, Fields v.
Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (No. 06-C-112); Sundstrom v. Frank, 630 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 977 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
105. Id.
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for each prisoner.10 6 The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting
the withdrawal of hormone therapy.0 7
Plaintiffs Andrea Fields, Matthew Davison, and Vankemah Moaton are
all male-to-female transsexuals who were prisoners in a Wisconsin
correctional facility at the time of the lawsuit.os All of the plaintiffs were
diagnosed with GID and were provided hormones prior to passage of the
Act. 0 ' After the DOC began tapering plaintiffs off the hormones, the
plaintiffs alleged that they experienced various symptoms, including nausea,
muscle weakness, increased facial and chest hair, breast reduction, mood
swings, and depression. 1 o After the district court granted a preliminary
injunction, and when the plaintiffs began receiving cross-gender hormones
again, their symptoms subsided."'
Although the plaintiffs may have experienced short-term side effects as
the state reduced and then eliminated the hormones, medical professionals
actually disagree as to the long-term consequences of taking someone off
hormones. For example, in Barnhill v. Cheery,112 the GID prisoner alleged
that he suffered a variety of negative side effects following the prison's
refusal to continue his hormones.113 Dr. Do, a medical doctor with twentysix years of experience, testified that in that case '"[i]t is unreasonable to
believe that [the plaintiff] is currently suffering any physical withdrawal
symptoms as a result of his not being prescribed female hormones' because
'[tihe physical effects of exogenous estrogen or other female hormones do
not reside in the system for years."' 1 4
According to the district and circuit court decisions in Fields, the state
did not defend the law on the grounds that hormones and sex-reassignment
surgery were improper treatment options for GID. Rather, the state argued
that (1) the state did not violate the Eighth Amendment when it refused to

106. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
107. Id. at 835; see also Sundstrom, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 977. The initial lawsuit included
Kari Sundstrom and Lindsey Blackwell. They were dismissed from the lawsuit in October of
2007 because they were released from prison. Fields,712 F. Supp. 2d at 834 n.1.
108. Id. at 835.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Barnhill v. Cheery, No. 8:06-CV-922-T-23TGW, 2008 WL 759322 (M.D. Fla. March
20, 2008).
113. Id. at *2.

114. Id. at *3.
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provide a specific form of treatment desired by the prisoner,' 15 and (2) it has
legitimate safety and security concerns for passing the Act."1 Because the
state "did not produce any evidence that another treatment could be an
adequate replacement for hormone therapy,""' the state doomed its
argument that the court should defer to the state's decision not to provide
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery.
With respect to the alleged security concern, the plaintiffs in Fields
argued that the Act did not advance the state's interests in prison safety.'
Generally, prison administrators are given "'wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.""' 9 That deference is afforded unless the actions are
'taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose."" 20 The primary security
concern that relates to GID prisoners is the problems caused as a result of
sexual activity among inmates, which can result in volatile and dangerous
conditions.' 2 '
In Fields, the state's security expert testified that the more feminine a
male prisoner becomes the more likely it becomes that he will be a victim of
sexual assault by fellow prisoners.'22 The same expert, however, also
testified that a prison he worked for in another state was able to manage
security concerns raised by men who were receiving feminizing
hormones.' 2 3 In concluding that the state's security concerns were
insufficient to overcome the plaintiffs' claims, the district court found that,

115. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2011).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 556.
118. Id.
at 557.
119. Id. at 557-58 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986)).
120. Id. at 558 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322).
121. Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
122. Fields, 653 F.3d at 557. The National Center for Lesbian Rights understands the
increased safety risk, stating that housing inmates who have not had sex-reassignment
surgery, based on their birth sex regardless of how they have lived or how much treatment
they have undergone puts male to female transsexuals at great risk of sexual violence. Rights
of Transgendered Prisoners,NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS 1 (June 2006), available
at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/RightsofTransgenderPrisoners.pddoclD=6381.
Some propose that prisons should place men who are taking feminizing hormones in the
female prison population. E.g., Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered
PrisonersCaught in the GenderBinarism, 6 MICH. J.GENDER & L. 499, 531 (2000).
123. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
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although one of the plaintiffs had been sexually assaulted while receiving
hormones in prison, there was nothing in the record to indicate he would
not have otherwise been the victim of sexual assault. 124 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion as to the security concern.125 By
order dated August 5, 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of a permanent injunction preventing implementation of the Act. 126
Specifically, the district court restrained the state and prison officials from
enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the Act that place a
complete ban on the provision of cross-gender hormones. 1 27
B. A FederalJudge in MassachusettsIs the Firstto Order a State to Pay for a
Prisonerwith GID to Receive a Sex-Reassignment Surgery.12 8
Robert Kosilek, who prefers to be called Michelle, is a male-to-female
transsexual prisoner housed in a state prison in Massachusetts. 129 He
brought suit, asking that the state be required to pay for his transition from
male to female."'o After more than a decade of litigation and at least five
publicly available opinions by the district and circuit court of appeals, on
September 4, 2012, a federal district judge in Massachusetts became the first
judge in the nation to order a prison to provide a sex-reassignment surgery
for one of its prisoners."'
Kosilek was convicted in 1992 of murdering his wife and sentenced to life
in prison without parole.132 Prior to meeting his wife, Kosilek had taken
female hormones, which had made him feel "normal" for the first time in

124. Id.
125. Fields, 653 F.3d at 558. Plaintiffs separately claimed in Fields that the state's
categorical ban on providing hormones or sex-reassignment surgery violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867. Although
the district court held that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit
declined to reach the issue. Fields,653 F.3d at 559.
126. Id.
127. Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
128. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2012).
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *53; see also Pauline Kim, MassachusettsJudge Rules for Inmate's Sex-Change
Surgery, CNN HEALTH (Sep. 6, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/04/health/
massachusetts-sex-change-surgery-inmate/index.html.
132. Kosilek, 2012 WL 3799660, at *1.
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his life. 133 The trial testimony revealed that Kosilek regularly was abused by
his grandfather and, when Kosilek announced his desire to live as a girl, was
stabbed by his stepfather. 134 Kosilek eventually obtained female hormones
from a doctor in exchange for sex.'35
While in a drug rehabilitation facility, Kosilek met his wife, Cheryl
13
McCaul, who was a volunteer at the facility."
McCaul convinced Kosilek
that his transsexualism "would be cured by 'a good woman." 37
Unfortunately, during his marriage his distress over gender identity
continued."' In 1990, after McCaul became angry when she discovered
Kosilek wearing McCaul's clothing, Kosilek murdered her.139 While
awaiting trial for murder, he began taking female hormones in the form of
birth control pills that a guard illegally provided to Kosilek.140 Prior to his
trial, the county sheriff denied Kosilek any treatment for his gender identity
disorder.' 4 ' Kosilek then twice attempted suicide and once attempted to
castrate himself.142 After his conviction, Kosilek began "living like a
woman," and changed his name to Michelle.143
While Kosilek was in prison, doctors under contract with the DOC
diagnosed Kosilek with GID and prescribed hormones and, possibly, sexreassignment surgery.'" At that time, the DOC's policy presumptively
permitted prisoners to obtain hormones if the prisoner had been prescribed
hormones prior to entering the prison facility, but it only allowed an
increase or decrease in treatment if it was determined to be medically
necessary and approved by both the Director of the Department of Health
Services Division and the Commissioner.145 GID was the only medical
condition that required DOC doctors to obtain the Commissioner's
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
2012).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Kosilek v. Malone, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163-64 (D. Mass. 2002).
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 WL 3799660, at *17 (D. Mass. Sept. 4,
Id.
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *22.
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approval to provide treatment that doctors found to be medically
necessary.' 6 After the DOC failed to provide Kosilek with the prescribed
hormones, because he had not been receiving them prior to incarceration,
he filed suit asserting an Eighth Amendment claim. 4 1
In 2002, the federal district court concluded that Kosilek had a serious
medical need and had been denied adequate medical care.' 4 The court,
however, did not order the DOC to provide hormones.'4 1 Instead, the court
issued an opinion explaining that Kosilek must be provided hormones
unless the DOC concludes, in good faith, that it could not discharge its duty
to protect the safety of its inmates. 50 The court specifically cautioned the
DOC that it would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if the
hormones, and possibly sex-reassignment surgery, were denied as a result of
costs or potential public controversy.' After the decision, doctors engaged
a GID specialist to evaluate Kosilek.15 2
Pursuant to the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care, the doctor
recommended that Kosilek be provided estrogen therapy, electrolysis to
remove facial hair, and access to female clothing and makeup.' The doctor
specifically mentioned that after a year of treatment with hormones and
living as a female, Kosilek should be assessed for the possibility of sexreassignment surgery.' 54
The DOC asked the superintendent of the prison where Kosilek was
housed to prepare a written report as to whether it would create any
security risks to provide hormones to Kosilek."' Specifically, the DOC was
concerned that a security risk existed in light of the large population of sex
offenders in the prison system.156 The superintendent's report concluded
that providing hormones would not present a security risk but that the risk

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at *2, *21.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *23.
Id.
Id.
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would need to be reevaluated once Kosilek began to experience physical
changes from the hormone treatment.15 7
In August 2003, Kosilek began taking estrogen hormones and, in
15
In December
October 2003, he began wearing female undergarments.s
2003, a new Commissioner, Ms. Dennehy, took office."' Dennehy had
played an integral role as part of the DOC's prior efforts to prevent Kosilek
6
Before she would consider
from receiving hormones for his GID."'
approving laser hair removal or any additional steps toward sexreassignment surgery, Dennehy ordered a reevaluation of Kosilek.' 6'
In September 2004, Kosilek had been taking hormones for a year and was
due for an evaluation for possible sex-reassignment surgery. 16 2 Rather than
use doctors identified by the University of Massachusetts Correctional
Health Program, which was under contract with the DOC to provide
medical services to prison inmates, Dennehy commissioned another expert
to evaluate Kosilek.16 3 Dennehy selected an individual who was working
with two other states that also did not believe sex-reassignment surgery
should be provided to prisoners with GID.
In the meantime, the doctors retained from University of Massachusetts
issued their report.165 The doctors concluded that Kosilek had demonstrated
an ability to live as a female in a male prison while taking the prescribed
hormones.'" Nevertheless, Kosilek "continued to be 'quite distressed' about
his male anatomy."' 67 They opined that 'given her previous suicide
attempts, her ongoing distress, and the lack of other goals in her life, it is
quite likely that [Kosilek] will attempt suicide again if she is not able to
change her anatomy."'168 The doctors recommended that Kosilek have sexreassignment surgery.169 The court opinion makes clear that DOC officials
157. Id.
158. Id.
159.

Id. at *6.

160. Id.
161. Id. at*24.
162. Id.

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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did not believe that the Department should be required to pay for an
inmate's sex-reassignment surgery and that they did not want to be the first
in the nation to pay for sex-reassignment surgery for a prisoner.170
The key legal question in Kosilek was whether the failure to provide sexreassignment surgery violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.17 1 The district court heard conflicting
testimony about the proper course of treatment for GID.17 2 The position in
support of treating GID with hormones and sex-reassignment surgery was
based primarily on the Standards of Care established by Harry Benjamin
and adopted by WPATH.17 3 As discussed previously, those standards
establish a triadic sequence of hormones, real-life experience living as a
member of the opposite-sex, and sex-reassignment surgery.174 The
Standards of Care are based on the premise that sex-reassignment surgery
"is not 'experimental, investigational, elective, cosmetic,' or optional in any
meaningful sense."17 1
The state offered expert testimony from Dr. Schmidt, who believed that
the proper course of treatment for GID is psychotherapy and
antidepressants." 6 Describing Dr. Schmidt as an imprudent professional,
the court rejected his testimony, concluding that Dr. Schmidt's approach is
not "aimed at curing the mental illness," but rather is designed to simply
"manag[e] the symptoms of that illness to reduce the intensity of the
suffering and the risk of suicide."' 7 7 In other words, the court accepted the
viewpoint that providing hormones and sex-reassignment surgery to align
one's biological sex with one's perception of reality is aimed at "curing" the
patient, whereas providing psychotherapy in an attempt to discover root
causes to the intense desire to live inconsistently with one's biological sex is
unprofessional conduct. The district court ordered the DOC to provide sexreassignment surgery.17 1

170. Id. at *23.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id. at *35 n.12.
173. Id. at *35-37.
174. See id. at *36; see also supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at *36.
176. Id. at *38.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *53. The court did not order DOC to transfer Kosilek to a female facility after
the surgery. Instead, the court explained that the DOC "has the discretion to make good
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C. A FederalDistrict Court Upholds a Policy That ProhibitsHormones
Except in a Limited Set of Circumstances."'
Texas adopted yet another approach to treatment of GID prisoners. A
health care policy for the correctional system in Texas prohibits prison
officials from providing hormones to transsexual patients unless the
prisoner meets specific, limited criteria. The prisoner must (1) have a
confirmed parole or discharge date of no more than 180 days from the date
that the prisoner requests hormones, (2) demonstrate that he will receive
sex-reassignment surgery immediately upon discharge, and (3) provide
letters from a "free world physician and psychiatrist/psychologist" stating
that the prisoner has been on hormone therapy and intends to have sexreassignment surgery.180 Those who do not satisfy the conditions, however,
are still eligible to receive mental health treatment.181
After the prison refused to provide plaintiff, Allen Young, with
feminizing hormones, he brought suit alleging an Eighth Amendment
violation. The medical professionals in the prison concluded that Mr.
Young suffered from GID but that he did not satisfy the criteria to receive
hormones. In particular, the plaintiff did not have a confirmed release date
within 180 days and did not provide a physician's letter stating that he had
been taking hormones and planned to have sex-reassignment surgery
immediately upon discharge. 182 In lieu of hormones, Mr. Young was
referred for mental health counseling.18
The court reviewed prior case law from the circuit courts, finding that
"[niot a single decision, however, mandates hormone therapy. The manner
of treatment is within the discretion of the prison." 84 Because Kosilek had
not yet been decided, the court did not factor that case into its decision. The
court concluded that the defendants had not been deliberately indifferent to
Mr. Young's medical needs and that the policy was reasonable and
supported by legitimate penological interests.' Thus, the court upheld a
faith, reasonable decisions concerning security if the surgery genuinely creates or increases
any risk to Kosilek or others." Id. at *54.
179. Young v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Corr. Health Care, No. 6:11CV363, 2012 WL
262983 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2012), affd, 2012 WL 262617 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2012).
180. Id. at *9.
181. Id. at *15.
182. Id. at *9.
183. Id. at *15.
184. Id. at *14.
185. Id. at *15.
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policy that prohibited prison officials from providing cross-gender
hormones except in a very limited set of circumstances.
D. A Federal District Court in Virginia Upholds a Decision Not to Provide
Sex-Reassignment Surgery."'
A federal district court in Virginia upheld Virginia's decision not to
provide sex-reassignment surgery. In DeLonta, Michael Stokes brought an
Eighth Amendment claim against the Virginia Department of Corrections
("VDOC") for its refusal to provide Stokes with sex-reassignment
surgery." Stokes was diagnosed with GID and identified as a pre-operative
transsexual female."ss VDOC had provided him with hormones for four
years before this current lawsuit was filed."' While he was in prison, the
VDOC implemented a policy prohibiting prison officials from providing
hormones or sex-reassignment surgery to its prisoners.' 90 Stokes challenged
that policy in court, which resulted in a settlement between the parties to
provide Stokes cross-gender hormones.
Prior to Stokes's second lawsuit, Stokes had lived as a female in the male
correctional facility for more than a year by dressing and living as a
woman.19' Stokes, however, alleged that because VDOC would not provide
sex-reassignment surgery, the distress from the GID made him want to
castrate himselfl 92 He claimed that Virginia's refusal to provide sexreassignment surgery constituted a denial of adequate medical care and
placed him at a substantial risk of serious medical harm.193
The district court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim because Mr.
Stokes had received medical care, albeit not the sex-reassignment surgery he
desired. Citing a Seventh Circuit decision, the court explained that '[a]
186. De'Lonta v. Johnson, No. 7:11-CV-00257, 2011 WL 5157262 (W.D. Va. Oct. 28,
2011), rev'd, 2013 WL 310350 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013) (concluding that De'Lonta had stated a
claim for relief but refusing to suggest whether he would succeed on the merits or be entitled
to any particular remedy).
187. De'Lonta, 2011 WL 5157262, at *1. He separately alleged that it constituted a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation to deny his request to be housed in the
female facility. Id. at *3.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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prison is not required by the Eighth Amendment to give a prisoner medical
care that is as good as he would receive if he were a free person, let alone an
affluent free person. He is entitled only to minimum care.... Withholding
from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the wealthy can
afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punishment.""94
The court held that VDOC was not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Stokes'
medical needs. Rather, he had received treatment and his "dissatisfaction
with the progress or choice of treatment" did not state an Eighth

Amendment claim.19 5
As the various court decisions highlight, there is no consensus as to the
proper course of treatment for GID or, more particularly, whether a state's
decision to pursue one course of treatment over another constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation.
IV. HAVING TAKEN SIDES IN AN ONGOING POLICY, IDEOLOGICAL, AND
MEDICAL CONTROVERSY, THE COURTS HAVE IMPROPERLY INTERFERED
WITH THE DISCRETION OF PRISON OFFICIALS TO CHOOSE AMONG
TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR GID PRISONERS.

The courts that have ordered states to provide hormone or sexreassignment surgery have taken sides in an ongoing cultural controversy
and, as a result, have crossed the line from neutral arbiter of the law to
policy maker.'96 In a 1992 article, Dr. Paul McHugh explained that he

194. Id. at *5 (quoting Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997)). The Seventh
Circuit in Fields disagreed with its prior decision in Maggert, stating that the cost of
hormones and sex-reassignment surgery had declined since the late 1990s when Maggert was
decided. Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2011). The court in Fields explained
that hormones cost between $300-$1,000 per inmate, per year, and that sex-reassignment
surgery could be performed for approximately $20,000. Id. at 555. The court pointed out that
surgeries for coronary bypass or kidney transplant were more expensive, and yet, the
department of corrections had paid for those surgeries. Id. at 555-56. Comparing the cost of
cross-gender hormones and sex-reassignment surgery to that of a heart bypass begs the
underlying question of the proper course of treatment for GID. If it is considered a mental
disorder that can be effectively treated through psychotherapy, then it is not comparable to
heart bypass or kidney transplant.
195. DeLonta, 2011 WL 5157262, at *6.
196. Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Lawrence,
Justice Scalia states that the Court's opinion to overrule prior precedent and declare
unconstitutional Texas's anti-sodomy law "is the product of a Court, which is the product of
a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by
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cautions his psychiatry students at The Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine about "the power of cultural fashion to lead psychiatric thought
and practice off in false, eve[n] disastrous, directions.""' He maintains that
one of those missteps concerns the medical profession's response to the
demand by GID patients for sex-reassignment surgery.
Dr. McHugh's statements are particularly relevant given that Johns
Hopkins was one of the first hospitals to perform sex-reassignment
surgery."' When Dr. McHugh became director at Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine in 1975, he made it a priority to no longer perform the
surgeries.'" After studying patients with GID who had sought or received
sex-reassignment surgery, the decision was made to no longer perform
these surgeries.200 Through his research, Dr. McHugh found that sexreassignment surgery had not cured the patients because it had not treated

which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the
moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct." Id.
197. Paul R. McHugh, PsychiatricMisadventures, THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 497-510, at
Part III (Autumn 1992), available at http://www.1hup.edu/-dsimanek/mchugh.htm.
Although Dr. McHugh does not address it as another psychiatric misstep, the
declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder in order to appease various social and
advocacy groups, has led to alarming consequences. For example, in September 2012,
California passed a law that prohibits licensed mental health professionals from providing
any counseling to a minor for the purpose of discouraging a person's chosen sexual
orientation. Pursuant to the California law, the counseling has been deemed harmful and,
therefore, parents have been stripped of the right to consent to medical treatment on behalf
of their children. See S.B. 1172, 2012 Leg., 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2012) (to be codified at CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865).
198. See McHugh, supra note 62.
199. Id.
200. Id. He concluded his article by stating that the medical profession had "wasted
scientific and technical resources and damaged our professional credibility by collaborating
with madness [of changing one's sex through surgery in order to discover one's true identity]
rather than trying to study, cure, and ultimately prevent it." Id.
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the underlying causes that had manifested themselves as GID.201 Similarly,
many other hospitals stopped performing the surgeries.202
The American Psychological Association has admitted that the American
Psychiatric Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder
based on emerging, not established, science and the public pressure to help
alleviate discrimination based on sexual orientation; Dr. McHugh points
out that those who advocated for sex-reassignment surgery were similarly
swept away by prevailing cultural fashion. 203
The zeal for this sex-change surgery-perhaps, with the
exception of frontal lobotomy, the most radical therapy ever
encouraged by twentieth century psychiatrists-did not derive
from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments. These were so
faulty that no one holds them up anymore as standards for
launching any therapeutic exercise, let alone one so irretrievable
as a sex-change operation. The energy came from the fashions of
the seventies that invaded the clinic-if you can do it and he
wants it, why not do it? It was all tied up with the spirit of doing
your thing, following your bliss, an aesthetic that sees diversity as
everything and can accept any idea, including that of permanent
sex change, as interesting and that views resistance to such ideas
as uptight if not oppressive. 204

201. Id. Even the APA Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance pointed out
that "[cloexisting psychiatric conditions occur frequently among children referred for
clinical evaluation." 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 47. In
other words, there are underlying problems manifesting themselves in a variety of ways,
including as GID. The APA, however, did not acknowledge that GID is the manifestation of
issues that need resolving. Rather, the APA takes the position that GID itself can be cured by
changing one's sex characteristics. Id. at 32.
202. See McHugh, supra note 62. Dr. McHugh's conclusions are bolstered by a study
published in 2011 that followed postoperative transsexuals in Sweden and found many had
continued health and psychological issues even after surgery, including higher rates of
suicide. See Travis Wright Colopy, Setting Gender Identity Free: Expanding Treatment for
Transsexual Inmates, 22 HEALTH MATRIX 227, 266 (2012) (discussing study by Cecilia Dhejne
et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery:
Cohort Study in Sweden, PLOS ONE (Feb. 2011), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/
10.1371/journal.pone.0016885); see also Travis Cox, Medically Necessary Treatments for
Transgender Prisonersand the Misguided Law in Wisconsin, 24 Wisc. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y
341, 365 (2009) (discussing dissatisfaction of post-operative patients).
203. McHugh, supra note 197, at Part III.
204. Id.
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Rather than performing surgery to remove or alter body parts, Dr. McHugh
believes that the licensed mental health professionals must "learn how to
manage this condition as a mental disorder when we fail to prevent it."2 05
For those physicians who recommend sex-reassignment surgery, he stated
that they have "abandon[ed] the role of protecting patients from their
symptoms and become little more than technicians working on behalf of a

cultural force." 2 06
Outside the context of Eighth Amendment prisoner cases, the courts are
also divided on whether a person's sex is determined at birth or whether it
can be changed by surgery. A 1976 decision by a New Jersey intermediate
appellate court concluded that a man who had undergone a male-to-female
sex-reassignment surgery should be treated as a woman for purposes of a
marriage license. 207 As a result of the court decision, M.T., who had been
born a male, was deemed a female and, therefore, permitted to marry a
man.
Conversely, a Texas Court of Appeals in 1999 rejected the M. T.
reasoning, concluding that biology determined one's sex.208 After pointing
out its belief that the legislature could determine whether someone who
undergoes a sex change surgery should be legally treated as having changed
his sex, the court held that because "male chromosomes do not change with
either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. ... [A] postoperative female transsexual is still a male." 209 In reaching its decision, the
Littleton court pointed out that an Ohio court had reached a similar
decision in 1987 in determining for probate purposes that a male who
became a post-operative female was not validly married to another male.2 10
Adopting the reasoning of Littleton, in 2004, a Florida Court of Appeals
declared a marriage void that had been entered into between a biological
female and a biological female who had undergone a female-to-male sex
reassignment.21 ' In the context of a custody dispute, the wife and birth
mother claimed the marriage was void. The court of appeals agreed with

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
208. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
209. Id. at 230.
210. Id. at 228 (citing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) ("[A]
person's sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the birth attendant.")).
211. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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her, concluding that sex is determined at birth and, therefore, the marriage
between two women was void.212
The idea that people can change their sex has led to some strange
circumstances, including the headline Thomas Beatie, The 'PregnantMan,'
Wants A Fourth Child.213 Thomas Beatie was born female, underwent
partial sex-reassignment surgery, married a woman, and eventually became
pregnant. While Beatie was pregnant with her fourth child, she was
attempting to divorce her wife.2 14 The Arizona court hearing the divorce
matter questioned whether Arizona could divorce the couple-Arizona
prohibits same-sex marriage.2 15
The lack of clarity in the psychiatric and legal community about the
immutability of gender, whether GID should be classified as a mental
disorder, and, more importantly, what is the appropriate course of
treatment for GID, prompted the Psychiatric Times to publish an article
immediately after the Kosilek decision was issued. The article criticized the
Kosilek decision as "foolishness" based on "psychiatric experts, who may
again have led psychiatry down the slippery slope of diagnostic
overreaching."2 16 Dr. Phillips highlighted the fact that there is ongoing
controversy surrounding the proper diagnosis, label, and treatment of
GID.217 He explained that the DSM-5 workgroups, who have been working
on changes to the DSM-IV, have been criticized for their decision to change
Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria in an alleged effort to
remove social stigma attached to those with GID.2" He characterized the
current understanding about GID as one of "bewilderment over how to
treat" it, highlighting that "as with other value-laden diagnoses, there is no

212. Id.

213. Thomas Beatie, The 'PregnantMan,' Wants Fourth Child, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
4, 2012, 5:19 PM), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/thomas-beatiepregnant-man-fourth-child n_1855318.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.; ARIz. CONST. art. XXX.

216. James Phillips, Gender Identity Disorder in Prison:Depending on a Diagnosis that is
Soon to Disappear?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/

genderdisorders/content/article/10168/2105073. Dr. Phillips is an associate clinical professor
of psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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scientific way to decide whether GID or Gender Dysphoria is or is not a
psychiatric illness."
It is precisely the lack of clarity about GID, including its proper course of
treatment, that should lead courts to affirm a state's decision not to provide
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery. Given that a prisoner does
not state an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that the prison failed to
provide the treatment the prisoner prefers,220 prisoners should not be able
to demand injunctive relief requiring states to provide hormones or sexreassignment surgery. A state's decision to treat GID prisoners with
psychotherapy does not constitute a failure to treat with adequate medical
care. As Dr. Phillips pointed out, the decision not to provide hormones or
sex-reassignment surgery may be a failure to treat in a manner that is
consistent with current politically driven agendas, but it is not failure to
adhere to sound, professional medical judgment.
V. CONCLUSION

As with the American Psychiatric Association's 1973 decision to
declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder, the recent push to declassify
GID as a mental disorder has its roots in an ideologically driven agenda. In
a 2009 task force report on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual
Orientation, the American Psychological Association reported that the
decision to declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder in the DSM was
based on "emerging scientific evidence and encouraged by the social
movement for ending sexual orientation discrimination..
221 In other
words, the science did not then (or now) support the notion that
219219. Id. Dr. Phillips also questioned the expert testimony offered in favor of Mr.
Kosilek.

"We can wonder, after psychiatry's disastrous experiences with homosexuality and the
violent sexual predator statutes, why the plaintiff psychiatrists [Dr. Appelbaum and his
colleagues] would allow themselves to be sucked into this morass of another dubious, valuedriven, sex-related diagnosis? Does psychiatry need to look foolish one more time for its
diagnostic overreaching?" Id.
220. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d
240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Lane v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1981); Randall v.
Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1981). Judge Posner, in Maggert v. Hanks, has also
pointed out that "[w]ithholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment that only the
wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form of cruel and unusual punishment." Maggert v.
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670,672 (7th Cir. 1997).
221. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 11 (2009),
availableat http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf
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"homosexuality per se is not a mental disorder,"222 but political ideologies
drove the medical determination.
Similarly, the American Psychological Association's report on gender
identity and gender variance admits that there is not "sufficient research
concerning many transgender issues to develop empirically based
guidelines related to all important areas of practice. . . ."223 Nevertheless, the
APA adopts the view that one's gender identity should be affirmed, even if
it is not congruent with one's biological sex, because of discrimination and
stereotyping that is alleged to exist.2 2 4 The ideologically driven agenda is
demonstrated by the resolutions contained in the APA's report on gender
identity, where the organization states that mental health professionals
"take a leadership role in working against discrimination toward
transgender and gender-variant individuals," including support for "civil
marriage and all its attendant benefits, rights, privileges and responsibilities,
regardless of gender identity or expression."225 Encouraging a particular
course of treatment to assist the movement for civil marriage between any
two persons, regardless of gender, is what Dr. McHugh refers to as
"technicians working on behalf of a cultural force."226
Hijacked by the same ideologically driven agenda, courts have expanded
the Eighth Amendment beyond its intended scope to require states to
provide hormones and even sex-reassignment surgery to prisoners who
suffer such distress from the realities of their physical characteristics that
they self-mutilate and attempt suicide. Common sense dictates that the
proper course of treatment is to identify the underlying causes of the mental
distress and treat those issues-not to humor the patient's false sense of
gender identity. Doctors do not humor the deathly malnourished anorexic
who believes her mental distress will improve if she could simply lose more
weight or the healthy individual whose strong desire to be an amputee leads
to self-amputation; why, then, do treatment protocols exist that call for
mental health professionals to alter an otherwise healthy body in order to
align the existing characteristics with one's perception of gender?
Playing God, courts are acting on the presumption that we are not all
created male and female, but that we are created male, female, male who
should be female, and female who should be male. As a result, courts have
222. Id.
223. 2008 GENDER IDENTITY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 4.

224. Id. at 4, 65-66.
225. Id. at 66.
226. McHugh, supra note 197, at Part III.
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begun to mandate that states pay for hormones and surgeries that indulge a
prisoner's improper self-image. In the process, courts are taking sides in a
public policy debate over the immutability of sex, gender, and gender
identity. Not only are courts exceeding their authority in making such
policy decisions, but they are complicit in requiring doctors to violate their
obligation to "do no harm" when they order prisons to provide crossgender hormones or sex-reassignment surgery.

